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NOTES
Going Postal:
Analyzing the Abuse of Mail Covers
Under the Fourth Amendment
Since at least the late 1800s, the United States government has
regularly tracked the mail of many of its citizens. In 2014 alone, for
example, the government recorded all data on the outside of the mail
parcels of over 50,000 individuals via a surveillance initiative known as
the mail covers program. In the current age of mass surveillance, this
program-like all surveillance initiatives-has grown exponentially.
Unbeknownst to most citizens, the government now photographs and
records the exterior of each of the roughly 160 billion mail parcels
delivered by the USPS every year. Still, despite its ability to allow
governmental authorities to uncover a startlingly accurate picture of
citizens'daily lives, the long-abused mail covers program continues to be
implemented without any judicial oversight. This Note provides the first
comprehensive legal analysis of the mail covers program in the modern
era. In doing so, it also analyzes current Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence and advocates for the adoption of the mosaic theory to
privacy protection better capable of safeguarding citizens in an age of
unprecedented government surveillance capability.
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When you control the mail, you control information.'
-Newman
INTRODUCTION
President Jimmy Carter once famously stated that he uses snail
mail rather than electronic communications when he wishes to speak
to foreign leaders in his retirement. 2 Like many Americans in the wake
of Edward Snowden's alarming data privacy revelations in 2013,
President Carter fears that his emails may be monitored by government
authorities, and strives to use traditional mail services to evade Big
Brother's prying eyes. 3 Unfortunately for President Carter and other
privacy-conscious Americans, however, traditional mail services have
themselves been an integral part of government surveillance initiatives
for centuries.
Using a surveillance technique known as a "mail cover," the
United States government has regularly tracked the mail of many of its
citizens since at least the mid-nineteenth century, recording all
information on the outside of their mail parcels. 4 In 2014 alone, for
example, the United States Postal Service ("USPS" or "Postal Service")
processed a startling 57,000 mail covers.5 This means that throughout
2014 the USPS documented, at the request of law enforcement
agencies, the addresses, return addresses, postal dates, and other
information appearing on the outside of each parcel of mail sent and
1. Seinfeld: The Lip Reader (NBC television broadcast Oct. 28, 1993).
2. David Jackson, Carter Uses Snail Mail to Evade NSA, USA TODAY (Mar. 24, 2014),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/theoval/2014/03/24/obama-jimmy-carter-national-security-
agency-surveillance-snail-mail/6818605/ [https://perma.cc/7B44-NBUJ].
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., DAVID S. KRIS & J. DOUGLAS WILSON, NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS AND
PROSECUTIONS § 21.1 (2d ed. 2012).
5. See infra note 46.
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received by over 50,000 individuals for extended periods of time.6 In
addition, recent technological innovations have allowed the USPS to
begin photographing and recording the outside of each of the roughly
160 billion mail parcels it handles each year.7 Remarkably, all of this
surveillance occurs without any judicial oversight.
Due to the highly secretive nature of mail covers, it also occurs
largely without opportunity for postsurveillance corrective litigation.
The Supreme Court has never addressed the mail covers program, and
the program has been only sparingly litigated in lower courts. In the
few cases in which the program has been challenged, 8 it has been held
constitutional, in large part because of the apparent alignment of mail
covers with the third-party doctrine, one of the basic tenets of modern
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.9 This doctrine holds that an
individual accepts the risk that her otherwise private personal
information may be turned over to government authorities when she
willingly reveals that information to a third party, be it another person,
a telephone company, or, as here, the Postal Service. 10 Arguably,
however, there are unique aspects of the mail covers program that make
it incompatible with the third-party doctrine, suggesting that the few
decisions relying on this doctrine to uphold mail covers were wrongly
decided."
In addition, the third-party doctrine has itself been significantly
undermined in recent years. Indeed, a majority of the Supreme Court
now seems open to rejecting the doctrine in favor of new theories of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that better balance the interests of
6. There is reason to believe the vast majority of these mail covers would be for separate
individuals, given that extensions are available if a cover on a single individual needs to be
continued. However, it is likely that a small subset are repeats. The USPS has not made available
information that clarifies this point.
7. See Ron Nixon, U.S. Postal Service Logging All Mail for Law Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES
(July 3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/04/us/monitoring-of-snail-mail.html? r=0
[https://perma.cc/HN6T-ZDTS].
8. See, for example, United States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165, 209 (9th Cir. 1978), discussed
infra Part II.
9. The Fourth Amendment, enacted to protect citizens' homes and property from
unwarranted government search, states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
10. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435
(1976) (along with Smith v. Maryland, establishing the third-party doctrine and solidifying its
place in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
11. See infra Section II.B.1 (discussing, e.g., the governmental and monopolistic nature of the
USPS, which leaves individuals with little choice but to turn over their mailing information).
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law enforcement with the protection of citizen privacy in a modern,
technological age. 12 One such theory, coined the "mosaic theory,"
essentially states that collecting mass amounts of data capable of
revealing a detailed picture of an individual's life is an unreasonable-
and thus unconstitutional-search, even where individual instances of
more tailored data collection of the same kind would be allowed. 13 In
other words, the mosaic theory cares less about the process used for
information gathering and more about the quantity and content of the
information gathered. It therefore challenges any technique capable of
creating a detailed map-or "mosaic"-of a subject's daily activities
without a warrant.
Put simply, the mosaic theory pushes back on the idea that
individuals have no privacy rights whatsoever over the information
they choose to reveal to third parties. In doing so, it seeks to
reconceptualize the idea of a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in light
of newly evolving societal and technological norms.14 If adopted, the
mosaic theory would consequently transform Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence and open new avenues to challenge surveillance
techniques, like mail covers, that are designed explicitly to develop a
mosaic picture of a subject's cumulative communications.1 5
In order to consider this potential evolution of the Fourth
Amendment from a new perspective, this Note examines the
institutional and legislative history of the mail covers program-
perhaps the first government surveillance initiative to track citizens'
communications data. In doing so, it argues that the history of the
program reveals two realities: first, that the government has a long-
standing tendency to abuse broad surveillance initiatives and, second,
that the Court's use of the third-party doctrine has rendered it
incapable of combatting that abuse. The Note consequently employs
mail covers as a case study through which to advocate for a change to
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. More specifically, it argues for the
adoption of the mosaic theory and the implementation of a range of
reforms to current standing and discovery laws that will better protect
the long-neglected privacy rights of citizens.
12. See Stephen E. Henderson, After United States v. Jones, After the Fourth Amendment
Third Party Doctrine, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 431, 438-42 (2013).
13. See, e.g., Erin Smith Dennis, Note, A Mosaic Shield: Maynard, the Fourth Amendment,
and Privacy Rights in the Digital Age, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 737, 738 (2011).
14. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (creating the "reasonable expectation of
privacy" test).
15. See Benjamin M. Ostrander, Note, The 'Mosaic Theory' and Fourth Amendment Law, 86
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1733, 1750-51 (2011) (noting that the adoption of mosaic theory would call
the validity of mail covers into question).
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Part I provides a detailed examination of the history and inner
workings of the mail covers program, aggregating data from a number
of diverse sources to provide the only comprehensive scholastic analysis
of the program in the modern era. Part II analyzes relevant Fourth
Amendment law, culminating in an examination of the various
challenges to the mail covers program that may exist under present and
potential future versions of that law. Part III then proposes ways to
reform both the mail covers program specifically and Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence generally, with the goal of ensuring that
privacy rights are taken seriously in an age of mass surveillance.
Finally, the Note concludes by considering why such reform is necessary
given the undeniable security benefits of mass surveillance in a world
plagued by terrorism and cyber warfare.
Taken as a whole, this Note sheds new light on an area of
surveillance law that has been largely overlooked despite its expansive
influence on current surveillance initiatives. Perhaps most importantly,
it also reveals that, even as far back as the 1970s, the potential for
abuse inherent in government surveillance initiatives prompted courts
to consider something like the mosaic theory as an alternative to the
controversial third-party doctrine. In short, this Note exposes the fact
that the need for change in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence existed
long before Snowden's revelations made President Carter afraid to use
email and, indeed, long before modern technology opened our eyes to
the dangers of the surveillance initiatives that had been monitoring us
all along.
I. THE USE AND ABUSE OF MAIL COVERS
A. A Brief History
The sole authority and procedure for establishing a mail cover
and obtaining information from it derives from 39 C.F.R. § 233.3.16 That
regulation defines a mail cover as:
[T]he process by which a nonconsensual record is made of any data appearing on the
outside cover of any sealed or unsealed class of mail matter, or by which a record is made
of the contents of any unsealed class of mail matter as allowed by law, to obtain
information in order to: (i) Protect national security, (ii) Locate a fugitive, (iii) Obtain
evidence of commission or attempted commission of a crime, (iv) Obtain evidence of a
violation or attempted violation of a postal statute, or (v) Assist in the identification of
property, proceeds or assets forfeitable under law. 17
16. Mail Covers, 39 C.F.R. § 233.3(b) (2016).
17. § 233.3(c)(1).
2017] 1631
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Although these particular regulations were not implemented until
1975, mail covers have existed as an important investigative technique
since at least 1879,18 making them perhaps the first government
surveillance technique designed to collect citizens' communications
data.19 Until the 1950s, however, the public remained unaware of the
government's use of mail covers, and they were regularly implemented
without any material restraints. 20 The recklessness of the McCarthy
Era eventually changed that, and alerted the public that the
government regularly abused the mail covers program. In 1952, it was
revealed that a mail cover had been placed on Senator McCarthy
himself at the request of an investigator on the Senate Subcommittee
on Privileges and Elections.21 That same year, the CIA implemented its
New York mail intercept program, which began as a "proposal .. . to
scan exteriors of all letters to the Soviet Union and to record, by hand,
the names and addresses of the correspondents." 22 That program later
evolved into "one of the most significant CIA mail opening programs" in
history.23 Both of these scandals led the Postal Service to reconsider its
mail cover regulations in 1954 and add more specific requirements and
procedures. 24
Still, despite these new regulations, widespread use and abuse
of the mail covers program continued. In 1964, the public discovered
that the government had placed a cover on Roy Cohn, a prominent New
York attorney facing perjury and conspiracy charges. 25 This discovery
triggered public scrutiny of the program and widespread fear of
unsupervised government surveillance. 26 In response, the Senate
18. United States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165, 177 (9th Cir. 1978) (noting that the first postal
regulations authorizing the use of mail covers were put forth in that year but also recognizing
those regulations were likely implemented to regulate an already existing practice); see also KRIS
& WILSON, supra note 4 ("Mail covers have been authorized since the late 1800s.").
19. See Nicole B. Cdsarez, The Synergy of Privacy and Speech, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 813,
836-37 (2016) ("[T]he protection of communications privacy in America originated not from judicial
interpretations of the Constitution, but rather from early postal policies.").
20. See Invasion of Privacy: Use and Abuse of Mail Covers, 4 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 165,
166 (1968) [hereinafter Invasion of Privacy] (noting that the procedures regarding the use of mail
covers in the 1950s "authorized virtually any government employee to obtain a cover upon anyone
in the country, including Senators").
21. Id. at 165-66.
22. S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 567 (1976), http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/church
/reports/book3/html/ChurchB3_0287a.htm [https://perma.cc/Q7H3-EQ9J].
23. KRIS & WILSON, supra note 4.
24. Invasion of Privacy, supra note 20, at 166.
25. Id. at 170.
26. Id. ("Public belief that Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy was 'out to get' Cohn
triggered adverse public response to the use of this unusual investigative procedure. Further, the
incident brought to public attention the possibility that the government could monitor the mail of
a private individual.").
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Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure held public
hearings on the matter in 1965.27 Those hearings uncovered a startling
"lack of central control over mail covers," and revealed that "at the time,
there were approximately 1000 covers instituted per month, running
for an average of two weeks each." 2 8 Such revelations led Senator
Edward Long of Missouri, Chairman of the Subcommittee, to introduce
a bill to abolish mail covers altogether. 29 In response, the Postal Service
again revised its regulations, creating a "32-paragraph order" similar
to the regulations now in place under 39 C.F.R. § 233.3.30 While this
quelled Senator Long's threats of abolishment, however, it did not end
abuse of the program. 31
Congress passed the first statutory regulations related to the
mail covers program in 1975, after yet another public scandal brought
attention to the inconsistency and unsupervised nature of the program
when controlled by Postal Service regulations alone. 32 The scandal
involved a sixteen-year-old student who wrote a letter to the Socialist
Labor Party requesting information about its policies as part of an
assignment for her high school social studies class. 3 3 Unfortunately, the
student mistakenly addressed the letter to The Socialist Workers Party,
whose mail the FBI was tracking, and inadvertently became the subject
of an FBI investigation for "subversive" activities.34 The investigation
was extensive, even including a field investigation wherein an agent
was dispatched to the student's school. 35 The mix-up became local and
national news, prompting the creation and passage of the first version
of 39 C.F.R. § 233.3. These regulations essentially parroted those
implemented by the Postal Service after the public hearings in 1965,
including a broad provision allowing a mail cover to be instituted in the
interest of "protecting national security." 36 After the student sued and
a district court determined that the "protecting national security"
provision of the regulations was "unconstitutionally vague and
27. Id.; Invasions of Privacy (Government Agencies): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Admin.
Practice & Procedure of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 68 (1965).
28. Invasions of Privacy, supra note 20, at 170.
29. Id. at 172.
30. Id. at 173-74. A copy of these regulations, put forth in the Post Office Department's
Weekly Postal Bulletin of June 17, 1965, can be found at http://www.uspostalbulletins.com/PDF/
Vol86_Issue20478_19650617.pdf [https://perma.cc/TLK2-JN6S].
31. Invasions of Privacy, supra note 20, at 174-75 (noting continued abuse of the program
throughout the late 1960s).
32. See Mail Covers, 39 C.F.R. § 233.3, WL 39 CFR § 233.3 (Westlaw through Pub. L. 104-
208) (listing March 12, 1975 as the first amendment).
33. See Paton v. La Prade, 469 F. Supp. 773, 774-76 (D.N.J. 1978).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See id. at 779-81; KRIS & WILSON, supra note 4.
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overbroad," 37 however, the statute was modified in 1979 to include the
following qualifications:
Protection of the national security means to protect the United States from any of the
following actual or potential threats to its security by a foreign power or its agents: (i) An
attack or other grave, hostile act; (ii) Sabotage, or international terrorism; or (iii)
Clandestine intelligence activities, including commercial espionage.3 8
Since that time-now over forty years ago-mail cover regulation has
remained largely unchanged.
Unfortunately, the government's tendency to abuse the mail
covers program has also remained unchanged. Although its secretive
nature makes it difficult for individuals or watchdog groups to know
when the government has inappropriately implemented a mail cover,
documented instances of abuse-either in terms of a blatant disregard
for 39 C.F.R. § 233.3's requirements, a use of the program for nefarious
purposes outside the bounds established by § 233.3, or both-continue
to emerge.
In the early 2000s, for example, a defense attorney in San
Antonio learned that federal prosecutors had implemented a mail cover
in order to track communications between the attorney and her client.39
Although she complained about the blatant-and illegal 40-abuse, the
attorney never learned if the tracking stopped, and eventually lost the
case.41 Similarly, in 2011, a county supervisor in Arizona discovered
that her mail was being tracked at the request of a sheriff whom she
had openly criticized. 42 Calling the situation "a fishing expedition," the
supervisor sued the county and eventually received a $1 million
settlement that was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. 4 3 Finally, in 2012, a bookstore owner in Buffalo, New York
learned his mail was being tracked after he mistakenly received a
confidential notice intended for postal workers, ordering them to show
his mail to Postal Service supervisors "for copying" prior to delivery. 44
While the man had been part of the radical Earth Liberation Front
37. Paton, 469 F. Supp. at 782.
38. Mail Covers, 39 C.F.R. § 233.3(c)(9) (2016).
39. Ron Nixon, Report Reveals Wider Tracking of Mail in U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/28/us/us-secretly-monitoring-mail-of-thousands.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/B4Z6-ETK2].
40. § 233.3(g)(3) ("No mail cover shall include matter mailed between the mail cover subject
and the subject's known attorney.").
41. Nixon, supra note 39.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Nixon, supra note 7. A secondary link, available at http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2013/06/30/us/30postal-mail-cover-documents.html [https://perma.cclDXA8-ZXHH?type=image],
provides the notice.
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activist group in the early 2000s, had written books sympathetic to the
liberation movement, and had occasionally invited politically radical
speakers to his bookstore, he had not been actively involved in radical
activism for many years by the time the mail cover was apparently
implemented. 45 Each of these instances suggests ongoing abuse of the
mail cover program.
The sheer magnitude of the program in the modern age also
suggests abuse, abuse that the Postal Service itself has-to some
extent-admitted. In 2014 alone, the USPS processed over 57,000 mail
covers, 46 and an audit of the mail covers program revealed "systemic
failures in authorization and monitoring." 47 Such failures are
exemplified by the incredibly low rate of mail cover requests rejected by
the Postal Service. From 2010 to 2014, only 341 mail cover requests
were denied, while a total of 158,543 were granted.48 This is a rejection
rate of only two-tenths of a percent. Of the mail cover requests granted,
the audit revealed that over twenty percent had not been properly
approved and over ten percent had not been "adequately justified."49
Additionally, "928 mail covers [were found to be] in active status even
though their cover periods had ended."50 In sum, the government has
consistently abused the mail covers program throughout the program's
history-and that abuse continues today.
B. Continued Use, Abuse, and Expansion
Unfortunately, the obvious systemic abuses detailed above have
neither encouraged renewed reforms of the mail covers program nor
45. Id. The man, Leslie Pickering, recently filed suit against the USPS and the
Transportation Security Administration, alleging that they withheld information owed to him
under the Freedom of Information Act. He lost on summary judgement. See Pickering v. U.S. Dep't
of Justice, No. 13-CV-00674A(F), 2015 WL 1458089, at *12 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2015).
46. Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Postal Inspection Service Mail Covers Program-
Phase II Audit Report, U.S. POSTAL SERV. 13 (Sept. 15, 2015), https://www.uspsoig.gov/sites/
default/files/document-library-files/2015/hr-ar-15-007_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TLT-FCSP]
[hereinafter USPS Phase II Audit Report].
47. Steven R. Morrison, Mail Cover Surveillance: Problems and Recommendations, NAT'L
ASs'N CRIM. DEF. LAw. 3 (2015), https://www.nacdl.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset
.aspx?id=37034&liblD=33173 [https://perma.cclY7DU-FW2K]; Office of the Inspector General,
Postal Inspection Service Mail Covers Program Audit Report, U.S. POSTAL SERV. 1-2 (May 28,
2014), https://www.uspsoig.gov/sites/default/files/document-library-files/2015/hr-ar-14-OO1.pdf
[https://perma.ccl8VTY-TZUF] [hereinafter USPS Phase I Audit Report]; see also Josh Gerstein,
Audit: Snooping Safeguards Not Kept, POLITICO (June 19, 2014, 8:58 AM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/06/snail-mail-snooping-safeguards-not-followed- 108056
[https://perma.cclVZ3W-L3RD].
48. USPS Phase II Audit Report, supra note 46, at 13, 17.
49. USPS Phase I Audit Report, supra note 47, at 2.
50. Id.
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discouraged attempts to expand it. After the devastation of the terrorist
attacks on September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration endeavored to
amend mail cover regulations to give the FBI unfettered discretion to
determine when mail covers should be issued: "The plan would
effectively eliminate the postal inspectors' discretion in deciding when
so-called mail covers are needed and give sole authority to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, if it determines that the material is 'relevant
to an authorized investigation to obtain foreign intelligence . . . ."51 As
the shockingly low rate of rejections noted above makes plain, this was
in large respect only a codification of the status quo,52 albeit one that
certainly pushed the boundaries of the "national security" prong of 39
C.F.R. § 233.3 once again.53 Still, the plan was harshly criticized by civil
rights advocates and never enacted into law. 5 4
The Bush Administration was successful, however, in
implementing two programs that, while not mail cover operations
themselves, have drastically enhanced the surveillance capabilities of
the Postal Service. Together, the Mail Imaging program and the Mail
Isolation Control and Tracking program allow the Postal Service to
"photograph the exterior of every piece of paper mail that is processed
in the United States."55 That amounts to a record of roughly 160 billion
mail parcels every year.56 Both programs were allegedly implemented
to help sort mail and investigate suspicious packages. 57
The USPS claims that the Mail Imaging program has been in
use since the early 1990s, 5 8 while the Mail Isolation Control and
Tracking program began in 2001 after anthrax attacks claimed five
51. Eric Lichtblau, Plan to Let F.B.I. Track Mail in Terrorism Inquiries, N.Y. TIMES (May 21,
2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/21/politics/plan-to-let-fbi-track-mail-in-terrorism-
inquiries.html?-r=0 [https://perma.cc/LCZ8-SD8N].
52. See also id. (noting that postal officials have reported that "the Postal Service had not
formally rejected any requests from the [FBI] in recent years").
53. See discussion regarding the 1979 modifications to section 233.3, addressed supra Section
I.A.
54. See KRIS & WILSON, supra note 4; Lichtblau, supra note 51.
55. Nixon, supra note 39; Nixon, supra note 7.
56. Postal Facts, U.S. POSTAL SERV. 2 (2015), https://about.usps.com/who-we-are/postal-
facts/postalfacts2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/MSH6-DHPQ].
57. These photographs are now also being used to provide consumers of mail with a digital
preview of their daily mail via the Informed Delivery program. See Herb Weisbaum, New USPS
Service Lets You Digitally Preview that Day's Mail Delivery, NBC NEWS (Apr. 3, 2017, 7:32 AM),
http://www.nbenews.com/business/consumer/new-usps-service-lets-you-digitally-preview-day-s-
mail-n741926 [https://perma.cc/M5XX-DDER].
58. Lauren Walker, Postal Service Photographs Every Piece of Mail in the U.S., Shares with
Agencies that Request It, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 28, 2014, 4:47 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/postal-
service-photographs-every-piece-mail-us-shares-agencies-request-it-280614 [https://perma.cc/
K8BM-VQGV]. See the "update" at the bottom, including a response letter from USPS. -
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lives, including two postal workers. 59 Neither program was publicly
known until 2013, however, when investigations relating to ricin-laced
letters mailed to President Obama and Mayor Michael Bloomberg
revealed their existence.6 0 Since then, very little has been disclosed
about these programs. In a 2013 interview, then-Postmaster General
Patrick Donahoe noted that the images collected are not housed in any
single location, but are generally stored "for between a week and 30
days and then disposed of." 6 1 He went on to state that the programs
have been used by law enforcement "a couple of times."6 2 However, no
evidence has been provided to back up these claims, no other
government official appears to have ever addressed the programs, and
no information about the management, intricate workings, or
regulations of the programs has been made publicly available.
While not directly related to mail covers, these programs reveal
the extent to which mail surveillance has grown in recent years without
renewed oversight. 63 As cybersecurity expert Mark Rasch put it,
In the past, mail covers were used when you had a reason to suspect someone of a crime.
Now it seems to be "Let's record everyone's mail so in the future we might go back and
see who you were communicating with." Essentially you've added mail covers on millions
of Americans. 6 4
While this may be hyperbole, 65 the history of the mail covers program
is undeniably one wrought with a lack of oversight and consistent
abuse. This should concern the public for many reasons, not least of
which is simply how much information mail covers allow the
government to uncover. After implementing a cover, the government
can easily divine an individual's entire social network-including the
names and addresses of friends and family-along with critical
59. Nixon, supra note 7.
60. Id.
61. Andrew Miga, AP Interview: USPS Takes Photos of All Mail, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 2,
2013, 12:41 AM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-ap-interview-usps-takes-photos-of-
all-mail-2013aug02-story.html [https://perma.cc/64GZ-Z5N2].
62. Id.
63. The nearly exponential expansion of the mail covers program itself does the same. In
1975, when the last significant regulations were passed, only 3,699 mail covers were issued while
191 were disapproved, a rejection rate of five percent. See the concluding paragraph to Section L.A
to compare with the 57,000 mail covers and .02 percent rejection rate of 2014. The relatively high
rejection rate of 1975 is no doubt due in large part to Congress's interest in the program as it was
passing regulations. The fact that the program has grown so much since then with no new
regulations or significant hearings shows a renewed sense of apathy toward the program that has
allowed abuse to repeatedly surface. See United States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165, 188 n.18 (9th Cir.
1978) (citing mail cover disapprovals and approvals for 1973-1975).
64. See Nixon, supra note 7 (quoting Rasch).
65. Without more information, we really cannot know how these programs are being used.
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banking, business, and political information. 66 For example, there is no
limitation preventing the government from using mail covers to surveil
mailing lists sent out by schools, corporations, or other organizations.
Members of politically contentious organizations that may pose any
vague threat to "national security" under 39 C.F.R. § 233.3's guidelines
can thus be easily uncovered, and connections within such
organizations exposed.
Additionally, because the government also investigates the
senders and receivers of a subject's mail,67 the rights of "large numbers
of citizens" beyond those whose mail is actually being tracked are
implicated in mail cover investigations. 68 Finally, in the modern age of
online shopping, mail covers allow government agencies to know not
only when an individual has received a package but also, given the
relative sizes of packages and return addresses often adorned with
descriptive organization names, a good idea of what is inside. Together,
these connections can reveal a very descriptive picture of an individual's
network and daily life. This information is all gathered without a search
warrant or, indeed, judicial review of any kind.
To request a mail cover, a law enforcement agent need do little
more than fill out a standardized form.69 Once granted, a mail cover
remains in effect for thirty days, although it can be extended for up to
120 days with "adequate justification," and even that 120-day limit can
be extended with additional approval from the Chief Postal Inspector
66. See, e.g., Nixon, supra note 7 (quoting former F.B.I. operative James J. Wedick as follows:
"Looking at just the outside of letters and other mail, I can see who you bank with, who you
communicate with-all kinds of useful information that gives investigators leads that they can
then follow up on with a subpoena."); see also Choate, 576 F.2d at 187:
It is possible to learn the identities, addresses and frequency of contact of most of a
person's correspondents through a one-month mail cover including banks, creditors,
affiliations with religious, political, educational, and voluntary organizations,
publications received, accountants, and friends. Because many of these correspondents
maintain files on the addressee which can be discovered and used by the investigating
agency ... the mail cover used in combination with other techniques quickly makes the
subject's life an open book to investigators. (citation omitted).
67. See supra Section L.A (discussing how the government opened investigations on any
person who sent a letter to the Socialist Workers Party). Also see Lustiger v. United States, 386
F.2d 132 (9th Cir. 1967) and United States v. Schwartz, 283 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1960), in which the
Post Office contacted everyone who had corresponded with mail fraud suspects, and United States
v. Leonard, 524 F.2d 1076 (2d Cir. 1975), in which the Post Office investigated everyone who
received mail from Switzerland without a return address.
68. Choate, 576 F.2d at 188 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
69. See Nixon, supra note 7 ("For mail cover requests, law enforcement agencies submit a
letter to the Postal Service, which can grant or deny a request without judicial review."). To see
the standardized form used, see USPS Procedures: Mail Cover Requests, U.S. POSTAL INSPECTION
SERV. (March 2006), https://cryptome.org/isp-spy/usps-spy.pdf [https://perma.cc/UFF6-HQ2T],
also available as an interactive document at the secondary link listed supra note 44.
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or his agents.70 It has not been reported how often such extensions are
requested or granted; a 2014 audit reported that extensions were often
inadvertently and inappropriately granted automatically due to a lack
of oversight of mail cover system controls, suggesting that the initial
thirty-day limit may be startlingly flexible.71 The low rate of rejections
in initial grants of mail covers, noted above, also implies that Postal
employees often defer to the discretion of requesting agencies,
suggesting that a similarly low rate of extension rejections is likely.72
Once completed, information obtained from a mail cover is retained for
eight years, three years beyond the retention of national security-
related telephony metadata.73 It is unclear if any of these limitations-
or, indeed, any limitations at all-have been applied to the newer mail
imaging programs.
In short, mail covers are remarkably easy for the government to
obtain and only minimally restricted by limitations that appear to be
rarely followed, despite the long history of abuse inherent in the mail
covers program and the breadth of information it is capable of collecting
and retaining. As such, and in light of the current public discourse
regarding data privacy, it may be time to reconsider the program. At
least as far as courtroom challenges go, changing Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence may provide an opportunity to do just that.
II. CHALLENGES AND CHANGES IN THE COURTROOM
The most important case so far challenging the validity of mail
covers is United States v. Choate.74 There, a defendant charged with
income tax evasion challenged the constitutionality of the Federal
Bureau of Customs' use of a mail cover to uncover the name of a bank
with which he had an account-a fact that became crucial to the
70. Mail Covers, 39 C.F.R. § 233.3(g)(6) (2016); Morrison, supra note 47, at 6; USPS Phase II
Audit Report, supra note 46, at 6.
71. USPS Phase I Audit Report, supra note 47, at 6:
Attempts to extend a mail cover past its original end date resulted in an error message
being displayed in the ISIIS, indicating the mail cover had already been extended.
Further, an error in the ISIIS mail cover application sometimes allowed the same mail
cover tracking number to be assigned to different mail cover requests. This occurred
because management did not ensure system control features, such as integrity checks,
were operating as designed.
72. See supra the concluding paragraph to Section L.A (discussing mail cover rejection rates).
The fact that the bookstore owner discussed supra Section L.A was being tracked years after being
involved in arguably subversive activities is further evidence that mail covers may be lasting far
longer than intended under 39 C.F.R.§ 233.3.
73. § 233.3(h)(4); Morrison, supra note 47, at 23.
74. 576 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1978).
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Internal Revenue Service's case against him.75 The defendant claimed
that the mail cover constituted an illegal search under the Fourth
Amendment because it violated his "reasonable expectation of
privacy."76
This "reasonable expectation of privacy" test was first
articulated in Katz v. United States, wherein the Supreme Court
exchanged its prior, property-based approach to Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence for "the concept that 'the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places.' " In so indicating that "the reach of [the Fourth]
Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical
intrusion into any given enclosure," the Supreme Court opened the door
to new Fourth Amendment challenges, including those introduced in
Choate.78 Whereas only a month prior to Katz, the Ninth Circuit had
casually written off mail covers as conclusively constitutional, 79 the
post-Katz landscape now allowed for the (ultimately unsuccessful)
argument that an "overbroad" search could be unreasonable, even
where it was conducted "in an area in which [the subject had] neither a
property interest, nor any personal stake or claim," such as a Post
Office.80 Thus, Choate became the only case to substantially question
the validity of the domestic mail covers program under the Fourth
Amendment-and the Choate court very nearly ruled against the
program's constitutionality.8 1
75. Id. at 168.
76. Id. at 174-75.
77. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT,
§ 2.7(a) (5th ed.) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).
78. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
79. See Lustiger v. United States, 386 F.2d 132, 139 (9th Cir. 1967) (relying on earlier mail
cover cases that had not considered constitutionality to casually assert that "the Fourth
Amendment does not preclude postal inspectors from copying information contained on the outside
of sealed envelopes in the mail, where no substantial delay in the delivery of the mail is involved").
The cases relied upon in Lustiger were Cohen v. United States, 378 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1967), United
States v. Schwartz, 283 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1960), and United States v. Costello, 255 F.2d 876 (2d
Cir. 1958), all of which involved violations or obstructions of mail or postal regulations and failed
to even mention the Fourth Amendment. See Choate, 576 F.2d at 195-96.
80. Choate, 576 F.2d at 184, 199 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting). Note that Lustiger was also
distinguishable from Choate in that the defendant there was charged with mail fraud rather than
a crime unrelated to the mail, as in Choate. See id. at 196 n.46.
81. The Second Circuit considered a case similar to Choate with its decision in United States
v. Leonard, 524 F.2d 1076 (2d Cir. 1975), which "involved use of a mail cover to monitor all
incoming air mail from Switzerland without return addresses." Choate, 576 F.2d at 197
(Hufstedler, J., dissenting). However, as noted by Justice Hufstedler in Choate, Leonard involved
international mail that fell "within the rationale of the 'border search' exception to the warrant
clause of the Fourth Amendment," and could not be controlling with respect to domestic mail
covers. Id. at 198 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting). Thus, Choate remains the most-and perhaps only-
relevant case in discussions of the domestic mail cover program.
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This Part analyzes the evolution of the Fourth Amendment as it
relates to different theories of the constitutionality of mail covers-or
lack thereof. Section A considers the presently controlling third-party
doctrine and suggests that the underpinnings of this controversial
doctrine have been significantly undermined in recent years. It then
moves on to discuss the more privacy-friendly mosaic theory as a
potential successor to the third-party doctrine in Fourth Amendment-
focused surveillance cases. Section B analyzes the fate of the mail
covers program under the various iterations of Fourth Amendment law
discussed in Section A, revealing a wide range of potential challenges
to the program's constitutionality.
A. The Modern Fourth Amendment
1. The Third-Party Doctrine
As noted above, Choate involved a tax evasion scandal brought
to light in part through the use of a mail cover. In a 2-1 decision, the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision of the
district court and ruled against the defendant, relying on what would
come to be known as the "third-party doctrine" of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. 82 This doctrine states that an individual cannot claim a
"reasonable expectation of privacy" under Katz over information she
has willingly revealed to a third party. 3 Thus, in Choate, the defendant
could not claim that the mail cover violated his reasonable expectation
of privacy: because he had willingly revealed the mailing information
exposed by the mail cover to the USPS in exchange for mailing services,
he had assumed the risk that the USPS, as a third party, would turn
that information over to government authorities at any time.
The third-party doctrine had not been fully solidified as a basic
tenet of Fourth Amendment law at the time Choate was decided.
Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit majority applied the doctrine, relying on
precedent established in United States v. White, a 1971 Supreme Court
case that determined individuals have no reasonable expectation of
privacy over conversations disclosed in presumed confidence with
undercover informants. 84 It also relied on United States v. Miller, a 1976
Supreme Court case holding that individuals have no reasonable
expectation of privacy over original checks and deposit stubs they
82. Choate, 576 F.2d at 165.
83. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435
(1976) (along with Smith v. Maryland, establishing the third-party doctrine and solidifying its
place in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
84. 401 U.S. 745, 752-53 (1971).
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voluntarily convey to banks.85 Drawing on this precedent, the Choate
court reasoned that
[Tihe Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a
third party and conveyed by him to government authorities, even if the information is
revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the
confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed. 8 6
In other words, the court applied the third-party doctrine and denied
defendant Choate's motion to suppress the evidence collected as a result
of his mail cover.
Just a year after Choate, the Supreme Court confirmed the
third-party doctrine as a key aspect of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence with its decision in Smith v. Maryland.87 There, the
Court applied the doctrine to pen registers, a surveillance technique
wherein a device is attached to a telephone line and used to covertly
record the outgoing numbers called from the line.88 Echoing the
language of the Choate majority, the Smith majority concluded:
This analysis dictates that petitioner can claim no legitimate expectation of privacy here.
When he used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the
telephone company and "exposed" that information to its equipment in the ordinary
course of business. In so doing, petitioner assumed the risk that the company would reveal
to police the numbers he dialed.8 9
Put differently, the Court applied the third-party doctrine to find that
the defendant could not reasonably expect to keep private data he had
85. 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976).
86. Choate, 576 F.2d at 175. The majority also very briefly stated that the information on the
outside of an envelope may be considered in plain view, subject to search and seizure at will. See
id. at 174-80. In response, Judge Hufstedler noted in dissent that such information is not
suspicious or remarkable in and of itself and thus, under the plain view tests established in
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464-73 (1971), "falls within the set of cases as to which
obtaining a warrant will present no substantial problem and for which plain view offers no
justification." Choate, 576 F.2d at 204 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting). The case law surrounding the
plain view doctrine-which unanimously requires police officers to have a prior, probable cause-
supported justification to collect evidence before allowing them to obtain incriminating items found
in plain view-supports Judge Hufstedler's arguments. See Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466. The case
law surrounding mail covers also seems to agree with Judge Hufstedler, as it rarely even mentions
the plain view doctrine. Indeed, even the basic argument that mail parcels are in plain view is
weak, given that such parcels move directly from mail boxes to USPS custody and back again. See
infra Section II.B. 1 (noting that the USPS has been characterized as a bailee of mail parcels, with
duties to privately carry and deliver parcels). For all of these reasons, this Note will not address
the plain view argument in depth.
87. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
88. Other information collected by pen registers includes basic information about the
telephone line, such as "the number of times [the] telephone rings when incoming calls are
received." Robert A. Pikowsky, The Need for Revisions to the Law of Wiretapping and Interception
of Email, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 17 (2003). A "pen register does not indicate
whether anyone answers the outgoing [or incoming] call" and does not "monitor [or] record the
content of telephone conversations." Id.
89. Smith, 442 U.S. at 744.
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freely chosen to share, even if he shared it only with a phone company
and only for the limited purpose of connecting a call.
In many regards, this reasoning makes sense. The point of the
third-party doctrine is, after all, to accommodate the choices of
individuals regarding which information they choose to keep absolutely
private and which information they are comfortable sharing, at least in
some capacity, with others. Why should the government have the
burden of determining for itself which information should be
privileged-i.e., when a reasonable expectation of privacy exists-when
it can simply take its citizens at their word? The third-party doctrine
creates a clear, bright line rule for law enforcement that allows citizens
to decide for themselves when to sacrifice efficiency for privacy. It also
collects only noncontent data-what we now call "metadata"-so as to
protect freedom of speech and discussion, ensuring that the actual
content of conversations will not be obtained without a warrant.90 When
technology was rudimentary, much of this data was available to law
enforcement via ordinary surveillance mechanisms; the third-party
doctrine simply evens the playing field in an age where third-party
mechanisms of communication are so easily available to criminals.
Viewed in this light, it is a fair and necessary canon of Fourth
Amendment law.91
There are, however, many other considerations in play when it
comes to the third-party doctrine, especially given the now-dominant
role technology plays in daily life. One can no longer feasibly live as an
active and engaged citizen without frequently relying on third parties
such as internet and cell phone service providers. When the alternative
is effectively social isolation, the idea that anyone voluntarily conveys
their information to these third parties has become even more of a legal
fiction today than it was when Smith was decided. 92 Along the same
lines, the argument that metadata is not excessively revealing is no
longer convincing given that a significant portion of our interactions are
90. Note that the content/noncontent distinction so prevalent in surveillance law is not
parodied in other aspects of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Even in United States v. Miller,
discussed supra note 85 and accompanying text, the Court allowed suspicionless access to the
"content" of the bank records in question. See 425 U.S. at 442. Thus, this argument in favor of the
third-party doctrine is not relevant in all cases where the doctrine could be applied. I am indebted
to Professor Christopher Slobogin for pointing this out.
91. For an excellent summary of the positives and negatives of the third-party doctrine, see
Orin Kerr & Greg Nojeim, The Data Question: Should the Third-Party Records Doctrine Be
Revisited?, ABA J. (Aug. 1, 2012, 9:20 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/
the data-question-should-thethird-party-records-doctrine be revisited/ [https://perma.cc/
MX3T-WLEN].
92. See, e.g., Steven M. Bellovin, Matt Blaze, Susan Lanau & Stephanie K. Pell, It's Too
Complicated: How The Internet Upends Katz, Smith, and Electronic Surveillance Law, HARV. J.L.
& TECH. (forthcoming 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2791646 [https://perma.cc/7GPS-W2LC].
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now electronic. Each time we virtually connect with someone, we leave
behind a string of metadata that, taken cumulatively, essentially
becomes a "relationship database." 93 As scholars have argued, "Big Data
collection and the ready availability of personal data-peoples' GPS
locations, Facebook likes, etc.-are now pervasive, even ubiquitous
sources of information, most often in the possession of private
companies offering consumers all kinds of IP-based services and
products."94
The fact that metadata is particularly difficult to encrypt or
otherwise keep private compounds this problem, because it leaves
individuals with no substantive way to keep their virtual activities or
conversations out of the government's reach.95 Consequently, it no
longer makes sense to equate modern, nearly omniscient surveillance
initiatives with the rudimentary surveillance initiatives of the past, so
prone as they were to human error and evasion. As Justice Douglas
opined in his dissent in United States v. White back in 1971: "What the
ancients knew as 'eavesdropping,' we now call 'electronic surveillance';
but to equate the two is to treat man's first gunpowder on the same level
as the nuclear bomb."96 The sentiment has never been more true.
All of this suggests that the third-party doctrine is not
compatible with modern technological developments. As a result, many
courts have begun rethinking their application of the third-party
doctrine to surveillance cases. Indeed, even some members of the
Supreme Court now appear willing to embrace new theories of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence better equipped to address the realities of
the modern technological landscape. The most prevalent of these new
93. See Matt Blaze, Phew, NSA is Just Collecting Metadata. (You Should Still Worry), WIRED
(June 19, 2013, 9:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2013/06/phew-it-was-just-metadata-not-think-
again/ [https://perma.cc/C6FB-DR7V].
94. Bellovin et al., supra note 92, at 9; see also id. at 9 n.35 (citing C. Jernigan & B. Mistree,
Gaydar: Facebook Friendships Expose Sexual Orientation, FIRST MONDAY (Oct. 5, 2009),
http://journals.uic.edulojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2611/2302 [https://perma.cc/9CFF-KVDC] to
note that "social graphs, likes, etc., can be quite revelatory of an individual's characteristics, even
when these are not explicitly revealed"). I would add that the variety of apps now available and
used for nearly every facet of life-consider, e.g., dating apps, exercise apps, transportation apps,
and money transfer apps-can reveal a startlingly accurate picture of an individual's daily life.
95. Blaze, supra note 93:
Content can be protected, somewhat inconveniently yet effectively enough, with
encryption. But we leave trails of metadata everywhere, anytime we reach out to
another person. And while there are techniques (such as Tor) that can defeat metadata
traffic analysis under some circumstances, they don't cover all the ways we
communicate.
96. 401 U.S. 745, 756 (1971) (White, J., dissenting); see also supra note 84 and accompanying
text (discussing White).
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theories, introduced in the 2012 Supreme Court case United States v.
Jones,97 will be discussed in the next Section.
2. The Mosaic Theory
In Jones, the Court unanimously held that the government could
not, without a warrant, attach a Global Positioning System ("GPS")
tracking device to defendant Jones's car in order to record his
movements in that car twenty-four hours a day for a period of twenty-
eight days.98 The Justices were split, however, in their reasoning.
Writing on behalf of a five-Justice majority, Justice Scalia reinvigorated
the pre-Katz property-based approach to Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, arguing that the warrantless attachment of the GPS
device to Jones's physical property-his car-constituted an unlawful
trespass.99 By deciding the case on these narrow grounds, the Scalia
majority evaded the Katz "reasonable expectation of privacy" test
altogether, leaving the third-party doctrine unchanged. 100
In contrast, a four-Justice concurrence written by Justice Alito,
along with a solo concurrence penned by Justice Sotomayor, took on the
third-party doctrine more directly, considering it in light of a new
theory of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence introduced by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in its lower-court
opinion. 101 This "mosaic theory" embraces the notion that individually
constitutional searches may become unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment when cumulatively collected.102 As the D.C. Circuit argued:
"Prolonged surveillance reveals types of information not revealed by
short-term surveillance, such as what a person does repeatedly, what a
person does not do, and what he does ensemble. These types of
information can each reveal more about a person than does any
individual trip viewed in isolation." 103
Justice Alito, while not explicitly referencing the mosaic theory,
clearly implicated its reasoning in his Jones concurrence, wherein he
opined that while "relatively short-term monitoring of a person's
movements on public streets accords with expectations of privacy that
our society has recognized as reasonable[,] . . . the use of longer term
97. 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
98. Id. It was actually his girlfriend's car, but that fact is not relevant to this discussion.
99. Id. at 404-13.
100. Id.; see also Henderson, supra note 12, at 449.
101. Jones, 565 U.S. at 413-31.
102. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010); see also Smith Dennis,
supra note 13.
103. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562.
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GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on
expectations of privacy."1 04 Alito essentially argued that the
government could use a GPS device to track a vehicle in a small number
of individual instances, but not to the point where all of those individual
instances combined to create a nearly complete picture of the subject's
daily life.105 In his view-and the views of the three other Justices who
joined his opinion-the use of data to create such a comprehensive
picture of an individual's daily activities goes far beyond what any
reasonable citizen would expect of the government, and is consequently
unconstitutional under Katz.106 While not an explicit attack on the
third-party doctrine, such reasoning implies that sweeping instances of
surveillance that society is unwilling to recognize as reasonable will be
unconstitutional, regardless of the subject's decision to turn over
information to a third party or, as in Jones, avail herself of public
amenities any third party could be observing.
In her solo concurrence, Justice Sotomayor tackled the third-
party doctrine more directly, asserting:
[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties . . . This
approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information
about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks. 0 7
In other words, Sotomayor acknowledged the enhanced role of third
parties in the modern world and, consequently, questioned the third-
party doctrine's assumption of voluntary conveyance.108
In Justice Sotomayor's view, this voluntariness issue could be
solved if the Court were to adjust the Katz analysis to take into account
the particular capabilities of the surveillance mechanism in question.109
This approach is different-and arguably more expansive-than
Justice Alito's, because it focuses on the objective power of surveillance
mechanisms rather than the societal expectations associated with those
mechanisms, which are capable of changing as technology does. As
Professor Orin Kerr summarized:
Justice Alito's opinion [in Jones] focused on surprise. It looked to whether the
investigation exceeded society's expectations for how the police would investigate a
particular crime. In contrast, Justice Sotomayor's approach looked to whether police
104. Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
108. Sotomayor's view here harkens back to a long line of cases questioning the voluntariness
prong of the third-party doctrine. See, e.g., discussions supra pp. 1643-44 and infra Section II.B.1.
109. Jones, 565 U.S. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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conduct collected so much information that it enabled the government to learn about a
person's private affairs "more or less at will." 1 10
Regardless, the bottom line is that, even if they have slightly different
views as to how the mosaic theory--or something like it-should be
implemented, many Justices on the Supreme Court now seem open to
the idea of evolving the Katz framework away from the third-party
doctrine in future cases, and even the Justice Scalia majority was not
openly opposed to doing so.111
This openness to a significant expansion of privacy protections
in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence could mark a turning point in
constitutional law. As described infra,112 this change has been long in
the making, but it has the power to open up new realms of
constitutional challenges. The mail covers program provides a
particularly apt example of what these new challenges could be and
where Fourth Amendment law stands today. As such, the next Section
will examine potential challenges to the mail covers program under
each of the two primary doctrines of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
in play in the post-Jones landscape: the currently dominating third-
party doctrine and the emerging mosaic theory doctrine.
110. Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 328
(2012) (citing Jones, 565 U.S. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)).
111. We will soon have a better idea of exactly where the Justices stand on this issue and
whether they intend to adopt the mosaic theory in Fourth Amendment cases involving the
collection of cumulative communication or location data. At the time of publication, the Court has
granted certiorari in United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S.
Ct. 2211 (2017), a case questioning the government's acquisition of certain "transactional records"
from defendant's cellphone service provider. Those records included the numbers dialed and
received from defendant's cellphone, as well as cell-site information detailing the locations from
which defendant began and ended his calls over a period of 127 days. 819 F.3d at 884. Citing the
third-party doctrine and the noncontent nature of the information at issue, the Sixth Circuit in
Carpenter rejected defendant's arguments that the government's search of such data required
probable cause. Id. at 886-90. In doing so, however, the Sixth Circuit was careful to distinguish
Carpenter from Jones, comparing the trespass that occurred in Jones with the relatively benign
collection of business records in Carpenter, and comparing the accuracy of the GPS data collected
in Jones with the relative inaccuracy of locational data obtained from the cell-site information in
Carpenter. Id.
The Supreme Court's decision in Carpenter will undoubtedly shed new light on the
Court's desire, or lack thereof, to evolve the Fourth Amendment. It could also significantly impact
the arguments presented in this Note. Still, the unique aspects of the mail covers program that
make it unconstitutional under either the third-party doctrine or the mosaic theory-see infra
Section II.B--will remain unchanged regardless of the outcome in Carpenter and, indeed, would
be significantly strengthened were the Court to reverse the Sixth Circuit in Carpenter and find
that an illegal search had occurred.
112. Section II.B (explaining that the third-party doctrine has been undermined in recent
years and revealing that even as far back as 1978 some judges were open to applying the mosaic
theory in surveillance cases).
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B. Mail Covers and the Post-Jones Landscape
1. The Third-Party Doctrine, Revisited
It is worth reiterating that the Supreme Court has never taken
up a mail cover challenge, and that Choate may have been wrongly
decided even with a strong third-party doctrine intact. Indeed, in
response to the majority's third-party assertions in Choate, both district
court Judge Ferguson and dissenting appellate Judge Hufstedler made
compelling arguments against the third-party doctrine in their
opinions, attacking it both generally and specifically in relation to mail
covers. Further, many of these arguments have since been supported by
Supreme Court precedent that significantly undermines the
underpinnings of the third-party doctrine.
For his part, district court Judge Ferguson considered the
reasonability of the defendant's expectation of privacy over his mail,
noting:
It cannot be denied that a reasonable person's expectation of privacy with regard to return
addresses on mail is a somewhat limited one. He understands that this information is
necessary to postal operations and will be examined and utilized in order to route items
when the name and address of the addressee is incorrect, absent, or illegible. But the
disclosure mandated by these circumstances is not broad or for all purposes: a reasonable
person still expects (1) that the information contained in the return address will only be
used for postal purposes, and (2) that it will be utilized in only a mechanical fashion
without any records being kept. The recording and disclosure to non-postal authorities for
non-postal purposes that results from a mail cover extends far beyond these narrow
bounds.113
Here, Judge Ferguson challenges the notion, embraced within the
third-party doctrine, that each time a reasonable person expects-or
even intends-a third party to observe some of her information for
certain specified purposes, that person should expect the third party to
record the information. Instead, Judge Ferguson argues that privacy
need not be an all-or-nothing inquiry: in the context of mail covers, for
example, an individual can willingly turn over the information on the
outside of her mail for the explicit purpose of delivery while still
maintaining a privacy interest over that information as it relates to all
other purposes.
This idea that privacy is not absolute has gained traction in light
of Supreme Court precedent questioning the narrow conception of what
constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy under the third-party
doctrine. In the 2001 case Ferguson v. City of Charleston, for example,
the Court found a Fourth Amendment violation when a state hospital
obtained and tested urine samples from its pregnant patients and gave
113. United States v. Choate, 422 F. Supp. 261, 270 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
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the results to the police, who then arrested the patients and sought to
assist them in receiving drug treatment. 114 As the dissent noted, 115 this
was a departure from the Court's precedent involving undercover
informants-particularly its assertion in Miller that the third-party
doctrine applies "even if the information is revealed on the assumption
that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed
in the third party will not be betrayed."116 The departure suggests the
Court's willingness to find certain processes of data collection to be so
invasive as to be unreasonable, even if a robust third-party doctrine
would support their constitutionality. This potentially bolsters Judge
Ferguson's more expansive conception of privacy rights.
In his district court opinion in Choate, Judge Ferguson went on
to explain that an expansive conception of privacy rights was
particularly warranted in the case of mail covers because of the
governmental and monopolistic nature of the USPS. In his words:
[T]he fact that the Postal Service is a government-sanctioned monopoly cannot be
ignored ... [T]here are few alternatives to the mail. Surely, in a free society, citizens
should be left at least one unfettered means of communication which cannot be invaded
without the showing of probable cause necessary for a search warrant. To allow the
government to give an absolute monopoly and then to use it to invade the privacy of the
citizenry without the protection of judicial scrutiny is to license the blatant circumvention
of constitutional rights. 1 1 7
This provides an extreme example of the more general argument
against the presumption of voluntariness inherent in the third-party
doctrine discussed supra.118 As Judge Ferguson explains, the USPS
provides a perfect illustration of an organization with which individuals
must necessarily share limited information in order to engage in
modern life. The USPS's governmental connections make both the lack
of voluntariness and the potential for consequential corruption
especially clear.
Even without the governmental piece, however, the Supreme
Court has recently shown itself just as willing to limit the third-party
doctrine on voluntariness grounds as on reasonability grounds. In the
2010 case City of Ontario v. Quon, the Court refused to conclusively
determine whether a right to privacy existed for text messages stored
on a workplace cell phone, noting that it would not "elaborat[e] too fully
on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology before
114. 532 U.S. 67, 70, 83-85 (2001); see also Henderson, supra note 12, at 439.
115. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 93-96 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
116. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (discussed supra note 85 and
accompanying text); see also Henderson, supra note 12, at 440.
117. Choate, 422 F. Supp. at 270-71.
118. See supra pp. 1643-44, 1646 (detailing the general argument against voluntariness and
quoting Justice Sotomayor's concerns regarding voluntariness in Jones).
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its role in society has become clear." 119 It went on to clarify that "[c]ell
phone and text message communications are [now] so pervasive that
some persons may consider them to be essential means or necessary
instruments for self-expression, even self-identification," which may
"strengthen the case for an expectation of privacy." 120 Again, this
bolsters Judge Ferguson's conception of mail covers as outside normal
third-party rules, and proves that his concerns with the third-party
doctrine persist today.
At the appellate level in Choate, dissenting Judge Hufstedler
also challenged the third-party doctrine on mail cover specific grounds,
noting that the subject of a mail cover has neither control over which
mail she receives nor any reason to suspect her mail is being
recorded. 121 This compounds the voluntariness issue described above,
because it makes the idea of a voluntary conveyance even less
convincing for mail covers than for other forms of surveillance. When
talking to an undercover informant, an individual is on notice that her
words may be remembered and recounted. 122 When turning over checks
or deposit stubs at a bank, an individual knows those documents need
to be collected and the transactions they represent recorded so that the
bank can maintain correct accounts.1 23 When using a phone, an
individual is aware the phone company keeps a record of calls made,
and-at least at the time Smith was decided-saw that record each
month in her phone bill.1 24 And finally, when an individual drives on
public streets, she is on notice that others are watching at least small
portions of her journey.12 5
Yet, as Judge Hufstedler rightly acknowledges, this is not true
in the case of mail covers: while an individual knows the Postal Service
119. 560 U.S. 746, 759 (2010).
120. Id. at 760.
121. United States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165, 205 (9th Cir. 1978) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting):
Mail covers differ [from other information, such as bank notes, that may be revealed to
a third party] for a number of reasons. As noted above, the recipient of mail does not
knowingly reveal anything [-] mail on its way to him is surreptitiously examined
before it ever enters his possession. Moreover, the information in the form collected is
not known by him to exist anywhere nor does he consent to its compilation. . . . [TJhere
is no reason for a mail cover suspect to assume that a list of all his correspondents has
been compiled.
122. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (discussed supra note 84 and
accompanying text).
123. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (discussed supra note 85 and
accompanying text).
124. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (discussed supra notes 87-89 and
accompanying text).
125. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (discussed supra Section II.A.2). It should
be noted the driving individual, at least when not using GPS herself, is not aware others are
recording any of her journey. In this regard, the GPS example is the closest case to mail covers.
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must handle her mail in some minimal fashion, she does not know or
expect that it will record even a single parcel, let alone all of her mailing
transactions. 126 Thus, the idea of a voluntary conveyance of information
with knowledge that it may be recorded that is arguably essential to the
application of the third-party doctrine is not present in the case of mail
covers. And again, because in the case of mail covers the government
itself records the information, the situation is particularly problematic.
Similarly, in the context of mail covers, individuals have no
choice over which parcels of mail they receive, unlike which individuals
they choose to speak to, which banks they choose to transact with,
which phone calls they choose to make and answer, and which roads
they choose to drive on. Because it tracks mail the subject has not yet
received and may never have asked for, the mail covers program also
frequently collects information that is only precariously connected to its
subjects. In addition, the program involves a concerning number of
third-party rights by implicating the non-subject senders and receivers
of the subject's mail. 127
These issues-that mail covers are not reasonable, that the
governmental and monopolistic nature of the USPS renders subjects'
use of it involuntary, that subjects have no control over the mail they
receive, and that subjects are unaware of even the possibility that their
mail will be recorded-are unique to mail covers. Consequently, they
make mail covers particularly concerning from a data-privacy
perspective and serve to significantly undermine the third-party
doctrine's application to mail cover surveillance. While the practical
chance of any reversal of the mail cover program's constitutionality on
these grounds is slim given the sheer number of years it has existed
within the third-party landscape, then, this Note argues that, at least
theoretically, mail covers are unconstitutional even under the third-
party doctrine.
Alternatively, there is also an argument to be made that the
third-party doctrine simply should not apply in the context of the mail
covers program. This is because the Postal Service has been recognized
in some case law as a bailee of mail parcels, 128 and there is evidence to
126. Of course, the government could make its mail recording procedures better known and
(at least in a basic sense) solve this problem, but doing so would defeat the practical purpose of
mail covers, which by nature require a kind of societal obliviousness.
127. See, e.g., discussion supra note 68 and accompanying text (citing United States v. Choate,
576 F.2d 165, 188 (9th Cir. 1978) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting) and noting that "the rights of 'large
numbers of citizens' beyond those whose mail is actually being tracked are implicated in mail cover
investigations").
128. See, e.g., U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. United States, 246 F. 433, 435 (9th Cir. 1917) ("It is well
settled that the United States is a bailee for hire of registered packages and their contents .... .");
see also Lerakoli, Inc. v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 783 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1986) (characterizing
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suggest that "the third party doctrine [was never intended] to apply
where the third party is a mere conduit or bailee." 12 9 Indeed, "[c]ourts
in other contexts have recognized a reasonable expectation of privacy in
something left with a bailee" that would overcome any third-party
doctrine argument for mail cover constitutionality. 13 0 This would
suggest that the very concept of mail delivery is privileged in some way
that excludes it from the third-party doctrine's reach and requires extra
care by the Postal Service sufficient to make warrantless searches of
the parcels in their care unconstitutional. 1 3 1
In a similar vein, the nature of the Postal Service's handling of
mail calls into question the constitutionality of the mail covers program
even under the property-based interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment espoused by Justice Scalia in Jones. This is because, in
order to record the relevant information, "government officials must
take possession and detain, if only for a brief moment, private property
in a way that they would not possess and detain it if they were merely
processing mail for delivery." 132 Admittedly, at first glance this does not
seem nearly as significant as the trespass of officers attaching a
tracking device to an individual's car in Jones. However, according to
the legal definition of trespass, the brief taking of a mail parcel to record
its outer contents remains an "unlawful act committed against the
person or property of another," 133 and an "act of direct physical
interference with a chattel possessed by another."134 Technically, then,
it must be defined as a trespass, making the difference between a mail
cover and the more egregious trespass described in Jones "one of degree,
not quality."135
This argument would likely render all mail covers-or, at least,
those implemented without the requisite standard of suspicion-
the USPS as a bailee of mail parcels, a characterization that was essential to the outcome of the
case), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 827 (1986).
129. Henderson, supra note 12, at 438; see also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980)
(suggesting that an individual, in using a bailee to transfer or hold goods, takes a precaution to
maintain her privacy, and therefore maintains a privacy interest over the goods). This approach
implies that bailees are not to be treated as normal third parties, and thus that searches of
property in the care of bailees are unreasonable, at least without the requisite standard of
suspicion.
130. Henderson, supra note 12, at 437 n.36 (citing "United States v. Most, 876 F.2d 191, 198
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (bag left with store clerk); United States v. Barry, 853 F.2d 1479, 1481-84 (8th
Cir. 1988) (luggage left with airline); United States v. Presler, 610 F.2d 1206, 1213-14 (4th Cir.
1979) (briefcase left with friend)").
131. Note that this concept could be applied to situations beyond mail-e.g., to email held by
a service provider. See id. at 438 n.37.
132. Morrison, supra note 47, at 11.
133. Trespass, BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
134. Trespass to Chattels, BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
135. Morrison, supra note 45, at 11.
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unconstitutional. Consequently, a property-based challenge of this sort
would likely be unsuccessful. Theoretically considering such a
challenge, however, illustrates once again the precariousness of the
constitutionality of mail covers in particular as a mechanism of
surveillance, under either the third-party doctrine or the property-
based approach to the Fourth Amendment. It also serves to illuminate
the new kinds of property-based legal challenges Justice Scalia's
opinion in Jones may foster in privacy law generally.136
2. The Mosaic Theory, Revisited
The potential adoption of the mosaic theory offers particularly
fruitful avenues of challenge to the mail covers program. As Steven
Morrison has argued on behalf of the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers,
m he very purpose of a mail cover is to establish a target's network of people with whom
she communicates. This type of information is not available unless the target is surveilled
persistently and over a period of days. Mail covers are virtually explicitly meant to create
a mosaic. 3 7
Judge Hufstedler made this point in his dissent in Choate, noting that
mail covers can be viewed as even more invasive than "surveillance of
[an individual's] movements."1 38 This is because mail covers provide
access to information many individuals seek to keep private, such as
their political and religious affiliations, domestic and foreign contacts,
online purchases, and other information that could not necessarily be
gleaned even from the extensive GPS surveillance disallowed in
Jones.139
Additionally, mail covers already extend the basic period of
surveillance two days beyond that rejected for GPS surveillance in
Jones,140 and the history of the mail covers program reveals that even
136. Scholars since Jones have suggested, for example, that the government's interception of
phone and email communications constitute electronic trespasses. See, e.g., Erica Goldberg,
Commentary, How United States v. Jones Can Restore Our Faith in the Fourth Amendment, 110
MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 62, 68 (2011) ("Even in the Katz electronic surveillance case, the
Court could have retained the connection between property rights and privacy rights by holding
that an electronic connection to an individual's property (or to the phone company's property) is a
physical intrusion, albeit on a microscopic level."); see also Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most
of United States v. Jones in a Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory,
8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POLY 1, 12-13 (2012) (describing the attempts of scholars to rejuvenate
property-based Fourth Amendment challenges in the wake of Jones).
137. Morrison, supra note 45, at 11.
138. United States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165, 203 (9th Cir. 1978) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
139. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012); Choate, 576 F.2d at 202 (Hufstedler, J.,
dissenting); see also supra pp. 1637-38 (discussing amount of information mail covers can collect).
140. Mail covers are initially implemented for thirty days, where the GPS surveillance in Jones
was for twenty-eight days. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 403; Choate, 576 F.2d at 187 n.11.
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that duration is often extended further, to 120 days or more, with little
oversight.141 Compounding this problem, less scrutiny is initially
needed to implement mail covers than other forms of surveillance. This
is particularly true given that the "reasonable grounds" required to
begin a mail cover do not even need to be true according to the majority
in Choate, a reading in line with current mail cover regulations. 142 Mail
covers are also particularly cheap for the government to implement
compared to other surveillance techniques. The secretive Mail Imaging
and Mail Isolation Control and Tracking programs introduced in the
early 1990s and 2000s 14 3 only increase these worries, and look even
more like the kind of "dragnet type law enforcement practices"1 44 the
Court's decision in Jones is meant to protect against. All of this suggests
both that mail covers are uniquely designed to create a mosaic-style
picture of an individual's life and that they are particularly vulnerable
to abuse. Both of these conclusions make mail covers unusually viable
candidates for unconstitutionality under the mosaic theory.
Indeed, in her dissenting opinion in Choate, Judge Hufstedler
actually sought to apply an early version of the mosaic theory, noting:
While an individual may realize that an isolated piece of mail may attract the attention
of postal employees, he knows that ordinarily no one would have the ability or inclination
to remember who writes to him. .. . Thus, while we might concede that a sender or
recipient of mail impliedly consents to the visual inspection of the exterior of any
individual piece of mail for a purpose connected with postal service, he cannot be said to
thereby acquiesce in the storage of the information which creates a "data bank" usable
against him which would not otherwise exist. [This is particularly true because] the
compilation of data [regarding the subject's relationship with both individuals and
organizations] obtained through a mail cover exposes the personal life of the subject before
law enforcement agencies in a manner unobtainable even through surveillance of his
movements.145
141. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
142. Choate, 576 F.2d at 172 ("The regulations simply do not require the specification of the
factual predicate upon which the requesting agency bas[e]s its conclusion that the mail cover
subject is involved in the commission or attempted commission of a crime. Failure to specify this
predicate is proper under the regulations.").
143. See discussion supra Section I.B.
144. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983). Knotts applied the third-party doctrine
to find the government's use of a beeper to track the location of an individual's car for three days
constitutional. Id. at 285. In United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), the D.C.
Circuit Court's decision preceding Jones, 565 U.S. at 400 (both discussed supra Section I.B), the
D.C. Circuit quoted dicta from Knotts stating that "dragnet-type law enforcement practices," such
as twenty-four-hour surveillance of an individual, may involve "different constitutional principles"
than those considered in the third-party doctrine. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 556 (quoting Knotts, 460
U.S. at 283-84). The D.C. Circuit relied on this dictum to distinguish the long-term GPS
surveillance involved in Maynard and Jones from the limited beeper surveillance involved in
Knotts. Id. The court then took the opportunity to introduce the mosaic theory as a valid
alternative to the third-party doctrine where long-term surveillance is at issue. Id.
145. Choate, 576 F.2d. at 202-03 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting). Note that Justice Hufstedler also
had concerns that this kind of broad, all-inclusive mail cover posed significant First Amendment
1654
GOING POSTAL
In other words, Judge Hufstedler made the mosaic-style argument that,
although the information collected by mail covers is noncontent-based
metadata, it can be excessively revealing when enough is collected and
considered together. This realization led to her assertion that mail
covers violate a subject's reasonable expectation of privacy. 146
Significantly, this proves that even as far back as 1978--over thirty
years before the Jones decision-some judges disagreed with a
stringent, blanket application of the third-party doctrine to surveillance
cases, and opted instead to apply a version of the mosaic theory when
cases involved broad-based surveillance techniques. It also reveals that,
on the only occasion a judge considered a mail cover in the context of
the mosaic theory, she found it unconstitutional.
To summarize, then, under any theory of Fourth Amendment
law-be it the mosaic theory, the third-party doctrine, or even the pre-
Katz property-based approach-the constitutionality of mail covers
under the Fourth Amendment is precarious at best. As a result, the next
Part will consider how the courts could, if given the opportunity, use
one of the legal challenges outlined above to encourage substantial
reform of both the mail covers program specifically and surveillance
initiatives generally.
III. THE ELEMENTS OF LASTING REFORM
A ruling of unconstitutionality for an individual mail cover
would likely be insufficient to fix the longstanding history of abuse of
the mail covers program or serve to ensure such abuse did not continue.
However, such a ruling would indicate that the Court is serious about
privacy protections in an age of technological advancement. It would
also spur renewed congressional debate about the mail covers
program-debate that has stalled in recent years as attention has
shifted to more egregious abuses of newer surveillance initiatives.147
Indeed, this congressional apathy, coupled with the historical
ineffectiveness of congressional reform of the program without
heightened enforcement power, is exactly why it is so essential that the
Court finally take up a mail covers case. Addressing the corruption of
surveillance power through the lens of a surveillance technique as well-
issues. See id. However, because mail covers and mail issues generally have been treated squarely
as Fourth Amendment issues since the earliest mail communications case, Ex parte Jackson, 96
U.S. 727 (1877), this Note does not address the First Amendment question.
146. Choate, 576 F.2d. at 202-03 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
147. See, e.g., supra note 63 (noting that the nearly exponential growth of the mail covers
program in recent years coupled with an absence of new regulations or even congressional
discussion regarding the program suggests apathy towards it).
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established as the mail covers program-a program that in many ways
laid the groundwork for the creation and expansion of surveillance
initiatives generally-would send a clear signal that the Fourth
Amendment is not a dead letter when it comes to privacy protections.
Should such a case be brought, or should Congress choose to
address the program through legislation, there are a number of
opportunities for reform that would force the government to conduct
mail covers in a manner more protective of privacy rights and more in
line with the Fourth Amendment. There are also a number of
opportunities for reform that would allow the judicial system to better
prevent abuses of government surveillance power generally. This Part
considers some of those opportunities for reform. Section A addresses
the reforms capable of improving the mail covers program specifically,
and Section B addresses the doctrinal reforms capable of improving
judicial analysis of surveillance cases generally.
A. Mail Cover Reforms
A number of reforms could serve to improve the mail covers
program. First, a better system of enforcement should be established to
ensure that even the minimal standards of 39 C.F.R. § 233.3 are
followed. Implementing a quasi-judicial system to ensure that mail
covers are only granted where appropriate and for as long as necessary
would address this issue. At a minimum, heightened oversight protocols
within the USPS are needed to address the problems of inadequate
justification for and automatic renewal of mail covers detailed supra.148
Additionally, Congress needs to ensure that any remaining instances of
negligence or abuse in the implementation of mail covers do not
inadvertently benefit government prosecutions. This could be achieved
via the passage of "a law that requires suppression of evidence gleaned
from a mail cover if the evidence was obtained during the course of a
reckless or intentional violation of [39 C.F.R § 233.3]."149 Such action
would address a major issue in Choate, for example, wherein the data
gleaned from the mail cover were accepted despite evidence that the
requesting agent had falsified statements in order to implement the
cover. 150 Another, more explicit, method of dealing with the falsification
148. Morrison, supra note 47, at 20; supra Section I.B.
149. Morrison, supra note 47, at 20.
150. Choate, 576 F.2d at 194 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting) (noting that evidence had established
that the requesting officer did not have any information supporting his accusations that defendant
Choate was involved in a smuggling operation, that defendant Choate was in contact with a South
American smuggler, or that the mail cover would assist in any investigation other than the IRS
investigation opened after the mail cover had already been implemented).
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issue is for Congress to amend § 233.3 to require that the "reasonable
grounds" needed to request a mail cover are based on reliable
evidence. 151
Second, the data collected via mail covers should be retained for
less than the current eight years. It is true that this eight-year
requirement was implemented to encourage transparency and help
defendants, some of whom were being indicted significantly after their
mail cover had been issued, and who therefore could not access mail
cover records that had already been destroyed. 152 However, eight years
is an excessive period of time to retain such extensive data. National
security-related telephony metadata is currently retained for only five
years, and there is no justifiable reason to suggest that mail covers
should be stored longer. 153 Congress should determine a nonarbitrary
amount of storage time for mail cover data that will best serve the
interests of both government agencies and potential defendants without
retaining the data for longer than is strictly necessary.
Finally, far more transparency should be required regarding the
new mail imaging systems that photograph and record, for unknown
purposes and lengths of time, the outside of every parcel of mail
delivered by the USPS. A congressional report on these programs would
clarify why they are necessary and what benefits they serve. These
programs represent the exact kinds of indiscriminate, dragnet
surveillance systems that the Court has frequently been concerned
with, and the public should have access to more information about their
use. This is particularly true given that almost all citizens use the USPS
in some capacity and are consequently affected by the systems.
B. Doctrinal Reforms
A number of reforms could also serve to improve judicial analysis
of surveillance cases generally. First, the Court should explicitly reject
the third-party doctrine and embrace the mosaic theory. The third-
party doctrine's presumption of voluntariness in an individual's
151. In Choate, the agent requesting the mail cover noted: "It is felt that CHOATE and the
source in South America correspond by mail." United States v. Choate, 422 F. Supp. 261, 265 (C.D.
Cal. 1976). Judge Ferguson was adamant in his district court opinion that "an agency's mere
'feeling' that criminal activity is afoot [should not be] sufficient to provide the needed showing [of
reasonable grounds']." Id. at 266.
152. See, e.g., Choate, 576 F.2d at 209 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting) ("[U]nder the old, two-year
cycle, Choate would have found that all records of the mail cover request had been destroyed prior
to his indictment over two years later; undoubtedly other criminal defendants may find records
have been destroyed when pre-indictment investigation exceeds eight years.").
153. See Morrison, supra note 47, at 23 ("[I]f national security-related telephony metadata is
retained only for five years, the retention of more mundane mail cover data for eight years seems
arbitrary.").
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conveyance of personal data has always been a legal fiction. The mail
covers program, effective in tracking such data for so long only because
of the government's convenient monopoly over mailing, presents a
particularly clear example of this. 154 The mosaic theory's contextual
framework provides a more common sense approach to Katz's original
"reasonable expectation of privacy" test.
Critics who argue that such a drastic change would be too
disruptive to the legal system155 forget, first of all, that the
underpinnings of the mosaic theory have been around for decades. The
idea that the excessive collection of data should be unconstitutional
even where individual instances of the same kind of collection are
constitutional has long existed as a counterpoint to the third-party
doctrine. The mosaic theory itself was first introduced in Freedom of
Information Act cases in 1972,156 and Judge Hufstedler's dissent in
Choate reveals that judges have been willing to implement some form
of it in surveillance cases since at least 1978.157
Critics also forget that there are many iterations a fully formed
mosaic theory could take, not all of which need be excessively
disruptive. For example, the Court could implement a kind of threshold
test for mosaic theory applicability. This would allow the Court to use
the traditional "sequential approach" to analyzing a search or seizure-
whereby individual searches or seizures are examined in isolationl 5$-
unless the type of search or seizure in question involved the use of a
surveillance mechanism designed to indiscriminately collect as much
information about an individual as possible, thereby forming a mosaic
picture of her life. 159 A court could then ask, if the mosaic theory applied,
whether the surveillance mechanism had been used in such an
indiscriminate and invasive manner as to be unreasonable. 16 0 This
154. See supra note 117 and accompanying text (quoting district court Judge Ferguson in
Choate).
155. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 110, at 352-53.
156. Smith Dennis, supra note 13, at 744 n.42.
157. See supra notes 145-146 and accompanying text.
158. See Kerr, supra note 110, at 315 ("Fourth Amendment analysis traditionally has followed
what I call the sequential approach: to analyze whether government action constitutes a Fourth
Amendment search or seizure, courts take a snapshot of the act and assess it in isolation.").
159. This idea of analyzing searches or seizures differently based on their relative invasiveness
is analogous to an approach to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence espoused by Professor
Christopher Slobogin and known as the "proportionality principle." This principle "requires that
the justification for a search be roughly proportional to its intrusiveness." Slobogin, supra note
136, at 14.
160. As noted by Kerr, judges at this point differ on what "unreasonable" means in relation to
a mosaic theory: Justice Alito focused on surveillance beyond what a reasonable citizen would
expect; Justice Sotomayor focused on surveillance that allowed the government to obtain
information about specific citizens "more or less at will"; and Justice Ginsburg of the D.C. Circuit
in Maynard focused on the "likelihood that private actors would conduct similar surveillance."
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would allow a majority of search and seizure cases to remain unaffected
by the adoption of mosaic theory in surveillance scenarios. It may also
encourage law enforcement to use broad-based surveillance techniques
in more specific ways-for example, by targeting specific locations or
mailing addresses rather than collecting cumulative data about all the
places an individual goes or all the mail she sends and receives.
It is true, in other words, that the adoption of the mosaic theory
would "open a wide range of new questions for the court to answer,"
including when and how the theory should be applied. 161 This should be
seen, however, as an opportunity to make the Fourth Amendment work
again in an age of unprecedented surveillance capability that is simply
incompatible with a stringent third-party doctrine. If nothing else, the
history of the mail covers program proves that broad-based surveillance
initiatives are consistently abused despite congressional attempts at
reform. 162 A Fourth Amendment doctrine with more enforcement "bite"
is therefore essential to curbing surveillance corruption.
Even with a mosaic theory framework in place, however, other
doctrinal changes are necessary to ensure that courts are able to hold
surveillance programs accountable. Chief among these are changes to
current standing and discovery laws. Present standing laws preclude
individuals from bringing a case unless they can prove an "injury in
fact," meaning they can at least show that some concrete harm has been
caused or will be imminently caused by a defendant's actions. 163 Given
that surveillance initiatives are by necessity highly secretive, plaintiffs
are rarely able to meet this high standard, leaving most surveillance
cases to be dismissed for lack of standing.164 The fact that only a handful
of mail cover cases have been litigated despite the mail covers program
being more than a century old makes this fact painfully clear. In order
to ensure that judicial enforcement of surveillance programs is a real
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417-430 (2012); United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544,
562 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Kerr, supra note 110, at 330-31. These ambiguities would need to be
addressed, but the Court is well equipped to determine a new reasonableness standard of this sort.
161. Kerr, supra note 110, at 329.
162. See discussion supra Part I. Such consistent abuse in spite of congressional attention can
be found in nearly every other surveillance program of which the public is aware, as evidenced by
Edward Snowden's revelations, discussed supra in the Introduction. It is for this reason that
statutory reform alone will not be sufficient to address surveillance abuses.
163. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013) (applying this high standing
standard to cases involving surveillance initiatives).
164. See Christopher Slobogin, Standing and Covert Surveillance, 24 PEPP. L. REV. 517, 518,
522 (2015) (noting that Clapper's high standard combined with the covert nature of modern
surveillance initiatives makes it nearly impossible for plaintiffs to get standing in surveillance
cases); see also Marguerite Rigoglioso, Civil Liberties and Law in the Era of Surveillance, STAN.
LAW., Fall 2014, https://law.stanford.edulstanford-lawyer/articles/civil-liberties-and-law-in-the-
era-of-surveillance/ [https://perma.cc/2LQS-MUTE]; Stephen I. Vladeck, Standing and Secret
Surveillance, 10 ISJLP 551, 552 (2014).
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threat, and thus that surveillance officers know they may be prosecuted
for missteps, these standing rules must be changed.
These standing reforms could be implemented via the Court
overruling its prior precedent on the matter or via Congress taking
action to lower the requisite standing for secret surveillance cases. The
Court or Congress could, for example, "authorize challenges to
programs so long as plaintiffs could show there was a 'reasonable
likelihood' that their communications would be intercepted by the
government," rather than requiring "certainty" of impending
interception. 1 6 5 Alternatively, Congress could require more internal
oversight for secret surveillance programs, for example by requiring
greater adversarial processes in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court. 16 6 Both options would allow more surveillance cases to be tried
before a judicial body, bolstering enforcement mechanisms and,
hopefully, ensuring better surveillance practices.
It should be acknowledged that such reform would constitute a
major change to longstanding judicial practice regarding standing.
However, standing requirements were originally implemented to
prevent frivolous lawsuits and maintain appropriate separation of
powers within the different branches of government. 167 Expanding
standing specifically for surveillance cases upsets neither of these
goals.1 68 In fact, because unregulated surveillance chills the ability of
individuals to live in full intellectual freedom, and thus "undermines
interests 'essential to political participation,'" such an expansion in
standing laws is crucial to ensure the viability of democracy itself.169
In order for changes in standing standards to have any meaning,
though, some greater compliance with discovery laws also needs to be
enforced to ensure plaintiffs have access to relevant information. The
Choate mail cover case provides an excellent example of why this is
necessary. There, the defendant, despite multiple discovery requests
and a requirement in 39 C.F.R. § 233.3 that any information relating to
a mail cover be revealed through appropriate discovery procedures, only
discovered he had been the subject of a mail cover inadvertently,
through an attorney's misstep during an unrelated hearing.1 70 Unless
165. Viadeck, supra note 164, at 555.
166. Id. Note that Slobogin has questioned whether such internal oversight would really be
effective in garnering any change in surveillance practice. See Slobogin, supra note 164, at 529.
167. See Slobogin, supra note 164, at 531.
168. See id. at 532-33.
169. Id. at 538 (quoting JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 136 (1980)). For an
excellent analysis of this concept as addressed in the political process theory of constitutional
interpretation, see id. at 538-41.
170. The tendency for the government to ignore discovery requests for surveillance data, even
when statutorily obligated to provide such data upon request, is not limited to the context of mail
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law enforcement agencies are honest in discovery procedures and
provide the secret surveillance information required of them, plaintiffs
have no hope of finding essential evidence on their own.
Greater punishments for data suppression could help solve this
problem, and should be implemented. In conjunction, courts could
require proof that secret surveillance did not occur in cases where a
plaintiff can provide reliable evidence that it likely did. For example,
where a plaintiff reasonably makes a discovery request for surveillance
records and the government asserts that those records do not exist, the
court could require a sworn statement to that effect from the officers in
charge of the surveillance initiative in question. This would at least
create a stronger system of accountability amongst surveillance officers.
Finally, it is essential that the Court reinvigorate the distinction
between criminal law cases and national security cases in order to
ensure that broad conceptions of national security are not being used to
inappropriately justify overbroad surveillance procedures on suspects
accused of standard criminal activity. 171 The history of mail covers-
wherein a specific definition of national security had to be implemented
within § 233.3 to prevent its overuse as a justification-exemplifies this
point as well. 172 National security cannot be a blanket justification for
surveillance if the protection of privacy rights is to be taken seriously.
Each of these reforms would serve to better protect the privacy
of individuals without drastically altering the surveillance landscape or
hindering investigatory operations. Together, they could help increase
accountability and transparency, decrease corruption, and allow the
judicial system to act as a true check on government surveillance
capabilities. In order to foster greater public trust of government
programs, they should be implemented.
CONCLUSION
This Note has outlined the history of mail covers, examined the
relevant evolution of Fourth Amendment law and the potential fate of
covers. Slobogin has noted that the Department of Justice has regularly ignored the notice and
disclosure requirements of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Id. at 523. Other government
agencies frequently find loopholes to avoid these requirements altogether. Id. Additionally, many
other surveillance-related statutes, such as those governing the "metadata and PRISM programs
that collect phone and Internet information," do not have any notice or disclosure requirements
and may, in fact, forbid notice or disclosure. Id. at 524. The point is simply that a lack of notice
and disclosure in discovery is a systemic problem in surveillance cases that needs to be addressed
if plaintiffs are to have any hope of succeeding in litigation.
171. See LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE FUTURE OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE: PRIVACY AND
SURVEILLANCE IN A DIGITAL AGE 150-58 (2016).
172. See discussion supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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the mail covers program in light of that evolution, and offered reforms
that could improve the mail covers program and Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence moving forward. It may seem strange, to some, to take
the time to consider privacy and surveillance law through the
framework of a program so technologically outdated as the mail covers
program, but such thinking is in error. The mail covers program laid
the groundwork for nearly every modern surveillance initiative, and
apathy towards the abuse inherent in that program in many ways led
to the apathy surrounding surveillance today. The history of the mail
covers program, in short, reveals that a change to our collective attitude
towards surveillance and our enforcement of surveillance initiatives
has been needed for decades, if not centuries. It also reveals that such
a change is possible, and need not disrupt essential foundations of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Many today also argue that a lack of privacy is a small price to
pay for increased security in an age of terror. Such critics would
question the validity of any discussion critiquing security-related
surveillance initiatives, including this one. But this thinking, too, is in
error. The right to privacy forms the very foundation of freedom. Where
privacy is lost, freedom of speech and association are in jeopardy, and
democracy in peril. History, ravaged as it is with totalitarianism,
fascism, and resultant oppression, proves this point all too well. Indeed,
the Fourth Amendment was itself enacted to protect American citizens
from the tyranny of general warrants that allowed British officers to
search any home they desired and quell any indication of revolution
they found. 173 The point is simply that privacy is not the opposite of
security; rather, it is the prerequisite.
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